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Assessing the distributional impact of
reforms to disability beneﬁts for older
people in the UK: implications of
alternative measures of income and
disability costs
RUTH HANCOCK* and STEPHEN PUDNEY†
ABSTRACT
The UK Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) are
non-means-tested beneﬁts paid to many disabled people aged + . They may
also increase entitlements to means-tested beneﬁts through the Severe Disability
Premium (SDP). We investigate proposed reforms involving withdrawal of AA/DLA.
Despite their present non-means-tested nature, we show that withdrawal would affect
mainly low-income people, whose losses could bemitigated if SDP were retained at its
current or a higher level. We also show the importance of the method of describing
distributional impacts and that use of inappropriate income deﬁnitions in ofﬁcial
reports has overstated recipients’ capacity to absorb the loss of these beneﬁts.
KEY WORDS – disability beneﬁt, older people, welfare reform, disability costs,
income measurement.
Introduction
In the United Kingdom (UK) at present, older people with disabilities may
be entitled to one of two social security beneﬁts which are intended to help
with the extra costs of disability: Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability
Living Allowance (DLA). AA can be claimed only by people aged  and
over; DLA must be claimed before reaching age , but if awarded, can
continue past age . It is not possible to receive both beneﬁts
simultaneously. In Great Britain in November , there were .million
DLA recipients aged  and over, and . million AA recipients,
comprising respectively . and . per cent of the over- population.
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From April  DLA will start to be replaced by Person Independence
Payment which will differ from DLA in certain details but like DLA will have
to be claimed before age  and can continue in payment beyond  (Welfare
Reform Act , http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga///contents/
enacted).
At times of tight ﬁscal constraints, governments tend to scrutinise welfare
payments which may be being paid to people who could afford to manage
without them. Non-means-tested payments are likely to be targets for reform.
AA and DLA are not means-tested; entitlement to them depends only on
meeting the disability criteria. Internationally, attention has been paid to the
prospects for reducing state spending on disability beneﬁts for working-age
people (see e.g.McVicar ; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ) but there has been less analysis of potential reforms to
disability beneﬁts for people beyond retirement age. However, the drive to
more consumer-directed care services means that a growing proportion of
publicly funded care for older people may in future be provided through
‘personal budgets’ (actual or virtual cash budgets) rather than in-kind
services (Arntz and Thomsen ). The extent to which cash and in-kind
care beneﬁts should be means-tested is of widespread interest.
In the UK, disability beneﬁts for older people have been identiﬁed as
candidates for reform (Wanless ). In , the then Government set
out some options for reform of the system of social care in England, raising
the possibility of some reallocation of public spending away from these non-
means-tested cash beneﬁt programmes (Her Majesty’s Government )
into the social care system which is means-tested. Subsequently, it ruled out
‘any changes to AA or DLA in the next Parliament to fund the second stage
of [social care] reform’ (Her Majesty’s Government a: ). The
change of government in May  was followed by an announcement of a
newCommission on the Funding of Adult Care and Support which was asked
to ‘make recommendations on how to achieve an affordable and sustainable
funding system for all adults in England . . . The approach recommended
must be affordable and sustainable in the short and long term. It must be
consistent with the Government’s deﬁcit reduction plan’ (Secretary of State
for Health ). This commission concluded that universal disability
beneﬁts should remain but recommended that ‘the Government consider
how better to align beneﬁts with the reformed social care funding system and
that Attendance Allowance should be re-branded to clarify its purpose’
(Commission on Funding Care and Support : ). In July  the
Government published a progress report on social care funding which has
deferred any reform until the next public spending review (Her Majesty’s
Government ). Reform of AA and DLA continues to be the subject of
debate.
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
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It is not feasible to anticipate the possible changes to the pattern of
provision of social care if a full reform of both cash beneﬁts and social care
were undertaken. Our moremodest aim here is to analyse the consequences
in terms of income losses (and a few gains) of potential reforms of AA and
DLA, in the context of a general move towards retrenchment in beneﬁt
expenditures which might be a response to continuing public expenditure
constraints. We identify some important methodological issues which apply
more generally where reforms to welfare beneﬁts result in large changes in
incomes for some groups and/or involve beneﬁts which, like AA and DLA,
are intended to help recipients meet living costs that non-recipients do not
face.
We begin in the next section by discussing two important conceptual
issues that affect the presentation and interpretation of the potential impacts
of reform. We follow this with an outline of the relevant features of
the current beneﬁts system and potential reforms to it. Our baseline is the
– system of disability and other relevant pensioner beneﬁts. There
have been no signiﬁcant structural changes to these beneﬁts since then. Data
and methods are described next before we present analyses of a range of
potential reforms.
Presentation matters! Describing the distribution of reform impacts
An ofﬁcial view
Following the May  change of government in the UK, a new State of the
Nation report was published, questioning the targeting of DLA and saying
that:
over one in ﬁve of DLA claimants are in the top two income quintiles. (Her Majesty’s
Government b: )
This phrasing could create a presumption in the reader’s mind that DLA is
poorly targeted and that, consequently, there exists a possible case for its
curtailment. There are two obvious problems with this statement. The ﬁrst
concerns the concept of income: if the income deﬁnition used to construct
quintiles includes receipts of DLA, then the statement may be factually
correct but conceal the fact that curtailment of DLA would drive many DLA
recipients into the lower income quintiles. Thus, the way we choose to deﬁne
income for the purpose of describing the incidence of reform effects may
prejudice the debate in one direction or another.
The second problem with the State of the Nation statement is that it involves
an implicit comparison between the incomes of disabled and non-disabled
people, since the income quintiles are based on the whole household
Impact of reforms to disability beneﬁts for older people
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income distribution, while the incomes of DLA recipients are incomes of
people who have been assessed as being severely disabled. If disabled people
require a higher level of income to achieve the same standard of living as an
otherwise similar non-disabled person, a simple comparison of their income
levels gives a misleading picture of their relative living standards. The stated
objectives of the DLA system explicitly recognise this non-comparability, by
emphasising the additional costs of living with disability. For example,
guidance to potential claimants of the care andmobility components of DLA
refers to needs for ‘help with things such as washing, dressing, eating, getting
to and using the toilet, or communicating your needs’ and ‘guidance or
supervision most of the time from another person when walking out of
doors’. Such support is, in general, costly.
The authors of the State of the Nation report were aware of the problems of
income deﬁnition and costs of disability, since the statement was followed
immediately by a qualiﬁcation:
. . .(whenDisability Living Allowance is included in income and no account is taken of
extra costs of disability).
We would argue that is inappropriate to relegate such important issues to a
subsidiary qualiﬁcation which might be interpreted as a minor deﬁnitional
detail.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the conceptual issues of
income deﬁnition and disability-related need in more detail.
Income deﬁnitions for distributional analysis
Our unit of analysis is the beneﬁt unit, deﬁned as a group of co-resident
individuals treated as a unit by the beneﬁt system. For the older population,
this generally means a single person or a married or cohabiting couple (only
a small proportion of people over  have dependent children who would be
classiﬁed as part of the same beneﬁt unit). For our purposes, the income of a
beneﬁt unit can be decomposed as follows:
BI ¼ DB þMTB þMTDB þ OI :
For some purposes, we may wish to look at income available to the beneﬁt
unit after meeting housing costs, which gives a deﬁnition
AI ¼ DB þMTB þMTDB þ OI HC :
In these deﬁnitions, BI and AI represent income before and after housing
costs, respectively; DB is basic disability beneﬁt (AA or DLA); MTB is basic
means-tested beneﬁt (Pension Credit, Housing Beneﬁt and Council Tax
Beneﬁt); MTDB is the disability-related component of means-tested beneﬁt
known as the Severe Disability Premium (SDP); OI is other income
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
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(including pensions, investment income, etc.); and HC is housing costs. We
deﬁne housing costs as rent, mortgage payments and the local property tax
known as Council Tax. The policy reforms we consider here affect DB and
MTDB but leave MTB, OI and HC unchanged.
Used as a classiﬁcatory variable, income is intended to represent the
standard of living of the beneﬁt unit, so that we can say whether reforms tend
to affect those who can ill-afford or well-afford to cope with the impact of
reform. To reﬂect this aim, we adjust our measures of income for the
number of members of the beneﬁt unit, using the modiﬁed OECD
equivalence scale, which is used in the UK’s ofﬁcial Households Below
Average Income (HBAI) analysis (see e.g.Department forWork and Pensions
). In the ﬁfth section, we estimate and plot the average income loss of
people classiﬁed into groups according to their pre-reform income (deﬁned
in various ways). This is a very common method of presenting the results of
policy simulations (see e.g. Brewer et al. ; Creedy, Hérault and Guyonne
), and it focuses on the empirical association between two amounts
for each beneﬁt unit in the sample: their equivalised pre-reform income
and the equivalised loss they are expected to experience. The drawback of
this approach is that it treats pre-reform and post-reform income
asymmetrically, and perhaps misleadingly – the fact that someone is not
poor pre-reform does not mean that they could not become very poor post-
reform. Pre-reform income is not a good indicator of a beneﬁt unit’s ability
to manage if a fairly large part of that income were to be withdrawn by the
reform. More comprehensive descriptions involve symmetric comparisons
of pre-reform and post-reform incomes, for example by estimating the
numbers of moves into or out of poverty that would be induced by the new
policy, an approach we pursue in the sixth section. For the present, we work
with ﬁve alternative deﬁnitions of pre-reform income, which are set out in
Table .
The ﬁrst income deﬁnition is closest to the concept of total net income
used in HBAI statistics and the concept of income underlying the statement
from the State of the Nation report. It includes both disability beneﬁts and
means-tested beneﬁts. The second income concept (original income) is
intended to measure the beneﬁt unit’s underlying need for government
support, and comprises income exclusive of all disability-related and means-
tested beneﬁt. The third income deﬁnition is intermediate between these
two. It includes both original income andmeans-tested beneﬁt, but excludes
any disability beneﬁt and disability-related additions to means-tested beneﬁt
(SDP). This deﬁnition avoids a problem inherent in the conventional net
income concept – that, when the source of income (in our case disability
beneﬁt) which is the subject of a policy reform is included in the income
used to determine a beneﬁt unit’s position in the income distribution, the
Impact of reforms to disability beneﬁts for older people
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reform may change that position, complicating interpretation of results.
Income deﬁnitions IV and V are identical to deﬁnitions I and III, with
housing costs subtracted, and equivalised using the OECD modiﬁed
equivalence scale.
Comparing incomes of the disabled and non-disabled
If disability brings with it additional costs that are not experienced by non-
disabled people, then comparisons of incomes across the disability spectrum
are potentially misleading, since they are biased in the direction of making
disabled people appear more well-off than they are in fact. This is analogous
to the problem addressed by Radner () and Klavus () when the
value of in-kind beneﬁts (such as public health care) is included in income
without adjustment for the need that such beneﬁts are intended to meet.
There have been many attempts to estimate the costs associated with various
forms and degrees of disability either through attempts to identify those costs
explicitly (see e.g.Martin andWhite ; Sainsbury, Hirst and Lawton ;
Smith et al. ; Thompson, Lavery and Curtice ; Tibble ) or
implicitly by comparing the living standards of disabled and non-disabled
people on similar incomes (Berthoud, Lakey and McKay ; Jones and
T A B L E . Income constructs
Basic deﬁnition Formula
Quintiles for pensioner
population (£ per week,
April  prices)
st nd
I Total net income
before housing costs
DB + MTB +MTDB + OI  
II Original income before
housing costs (excludes
all disability and means-
tested beneﬁts)
OI  
III Non-disability-related net
income before housing
costs
MTB + OI  
IV Total net income after
housing costs
DB + MTB+MTDB + OI  HC  
V Non-disability-related net
income after housing
costs
MTB + OI –HC  
Notes : . Equivalised beneﬁt unit income calculated from the Family Resources Survey (see text).
DB : basic disability beneﬁt [Attendance Allowance (AA) or Disability Living Allowance (DLA)].
MTB : basic means-tested beneﬁt [Pension Credit (PC), Housing Beneﬁt (HB) and Council Tax
Beneﬁt (CTB)]. MTDB : disability-related component of means-tested beneﬁt known as the
Severe Disability Premium (SDP). OI : other income (including pensions, investment income,
etc.). HC : housing costs.
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
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O’Donnell ; Zaidi and Burchardt ). There are two difﬁculties here:
the conceptual problem of measuring costs and the sheer range of different
disabilities and consequent needs. There is no consensus of opinion in the
research literature on how best to measure these costs or their size. Policy
makers have also not solved this problem and the UK beneﬁt system delivers
ﬁxed sums to people within broad ranges of assessed care and, for DLA,
mobility needs. Although estimates exist of the costs of various packages of
formal social care services (see e.g. Curtis ), such costs are not the only
costs of disability. Moreover, when AA and subsequently DLA were
introduced they were not intended speciﬁcally to pay for care (Hansard,
 July , column , cited in Berthoud and Hancock  and
Department of Social Security ).
The use of any single estimate of the extra costs of disability would be open
to justiﬁable criticisms. Our approach is thus to use sensitivity analysis to
explore alternative assumptions about the average scale of these hidden
disability-related costs. We tie these alternatives to the minimum income
levels guaranteed under the pre-reform beneﬁt system to older people who
claim all their entitlements to means-tested and disability beneﬁts. For
people who are not eligible for the SDP, we use the Guarantee Credit (GC)
component of the Pension Credit system, excluding the SDP, as a basic
poverty line (£. and £. in – for single-person and two-
person beneﬁt units, respectively). For those who qualify for the SDP, we add
to this basic poverty line a proportion – per cent of the SDP (£. for
a single person, £. for a couple where both qualify). We extend this set
of poverty lines further by using GC + SDP plus a proportion of the AA or
DLA amount that the beneﬁt unit currently receives. This gives a range of
alternative poverty lines for a beneﬁt unit receiving AA or DLA of £. to
£ for a single pensioner and £. to £. for a couple. These
ranges allow for disability-related costs which vary from zero to a maximum
of that built into the present structure of the beneﬁt system. Each pensioner
beneﬁt unit’s income under the present and reformed beneﬁt system is then
compared to each of these poverty lines. For this comparison we use net
income after housing costs (deﬁnition IV) as it is this which is guaranteed
through the beneﬁts system. For example, £. is the minimum that a
non-disabled single pensioner would have to live on after meeting their
housing costs. We then examine the impact that potential reforms have on
the proportion of beneﬁt units with incomes below these alternative
thresholds and see the effect on these proportions of different assumptions
on the scale of disability costs. The poverty rates generated in this way are not
intended to be comparable with those based on widely-used deﬁnitions of
poverty such as  per cent of median income. Our thresholds are not linked
to the levels of income in the general population and even the highest
Impact of reforms to disability beneﬁts for older people
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threshold may not fully allow for the disability-related costs faced by the most
severely disabled older people. Note also that we make no adjustment to the
GC poverty line for people who may be disabled but who do not receive AA
or DLA, so our analysis will understate poverty in that respect.
Reform
The pre-reform system
Our interest here is in two groups of welfare payments which can supplement
the state pensions, private pensions and other incomes of people aged 
and over. The ﬁrst group consists of the non-means-tested and non-taxable
AA (claimable from age ) and the alternative DLA (whichmust be claimed
before reaching age  but payment can continue beyond ). AA can be
awarded at one of two rates depending on the extent of care needs. In
– the lower rate was £. and the higher rate was £.. DLA has
a care component and a mobility component. Recipients can receive one
or both of these components. The care component (DLAc) is payable at
one of three rates depending on the claimant’s care needs. The two highest
rates are the same as the two AA rates. In – the lowest rate was £..
The mobility component has two potential rates, £. and £. in
–.
The second group of beneﬁts consists of three means-tested beneﬁts.
Pension Credit (PC) is a general income supplement. Housing Beneﬁt (HB)
and Council Tax Beneﬁt (CTB) provide help with the costs of rent and
council tax. PC is made up of Guarantee Credit (GC) and Savings Credit
(SC). Beneﬁt units with assessable income below their GC level are entitled
to a GC payment which brings their income up to that level. The applicable
GC level depends on various characteristics of the claimant. The main
ones are whether the beneﬁt unit consists of a single pensioner or a couple,
and whether one or both partners is eligible for the SDP. To be eligible
for the SDP, a claimant must be receiving AA or the middle or higher rate
of DLAc and meet other ‘living alone’ conditions which effectively restrict
eligibility to those who do not have someone who does, or could, pro-
vide care for them (Age UK ). These conditions particularly affect
couples.
The SC is an addition which is related to the amount of income that the
claimant has above a certain threshold which in – was equivalent to
the value of the basic state pension, and subject to a weekly maximum of
£. for a single pensioner and £. for a couple. The threshold is
below the GC level so it is possible to be entitled to the GC or the SC or both.
In calculating assessable income for both theGC and SC, actual income from
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
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capital or savings is ignored but capital above a lower threshold is assumed to
generate a weekly income of £ for every £ of capital above that
threshold. The means tests for HB and CTB are such that most older people
entitled to GC are entitled to receiveHB and CTB equivalent to  per cent
of these costs. People with higher incomes are entitled to lower amounts
which decline as incomes rise. HB and CTB embody an SDP on the same
basis as PC. There is no upper capital limit for PC but for anyone not
receiving the GC, an upper capital limit applies such that, if capital exceeds
this limit, entitlement to HB and CTB is zero. Thus there are very com-
plicated interactions between PC and HB/ CTB.
Some reform options
We are concerned here with reforms which would affect eligibility for AA
and DLA among the older population. Reforms mooted by the previous
Labour Government were directed mainly at AA but did not rule out the
possibility of reforms to DLA for people aged + . We therefore examine
options which would affect only AA and some which would affect both AA
and DLA for older people. The reforms we examine are set out in Table .
All the reforms involve removing AA, meaning that there would be no
T A B L E . Simulated reforms of disability beneﬁt
Reform Description
Income components
affected
 Withdrawal of AA and the SDP DB #, MTDB #
 Withdrawal of AA with retention of SDP at its current level DB #
 Withdrawal of AA with corresponding increases in SDP DB #, MTDB "
 Withdrawal of AA, the care component of DLA and the SDP DB #, MTDB #
 Withdrawal of AA and the care component of DLA with
retention of SDP at its current level
DB #
 Withdrawal of AA and the care component of DLA with
corresponding increases in SDP
DB #, MTDB "
 Withdrawal of AA, the care and mobility components of
DLA and the SDP
DB #, MTDB #
 Withdrawal of AA and the care component of DLA with
retention of SDP at its current level, removal of ‘living
alone’ rule
DB #, MTDB "
 Withdrawal of AA and the care component of DLA with
corresponding increases in SDP, removal of ‘living alone’
rule
DB #, MTDB "
Notes : See Table  for abbreviations. . Note that reforms ,  and  can in some circumstances
result in gains rather than losses. The higher levels of SDP can result in people becoming
entitled to the Guarantee Credit part of PC and so no longer being subject to the upper capital
limit in HB and CTB. They then become entitled to  per cent HB and CTB which together
with their higher PC, can exceed the loss of AA/DLAc (care component of DLA).
Impact of reforms to disability beneﬁts for older people
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non-means-tested beneﬁt for people becoming disabled after the age of .
In reforms – DLA is retained so those disabled before age  would
continue to get non-means-tested support after  whereas reforms –, 
and  also remove the care component of DLA. Reform  removes both
components of DLA. Reforms ,  and  additionally abolish the means-
tested SDP, while reforms  and  retain the SDP at its current level and
reforms  and  not only retain but increase SDP to maintain the level of
disability beneﬁt for those who qualify. In practice, the retained SDP would
mainly go to single people without carers or couples where both are disabled,
due to the ‘living alone’ rules. Reforms  and  are versions of reform  and 
in which this rule is abolished so that everyone previously receiving AA or
the middle/higher rate of the care component of DLA is automatically
eligible for the SDP.
Reforms  and  would effectively constitute a comprehensive switch from
‘universal’ disability beneﬁt (AA and DLAc) to means-tested disability
beneﬁt (enhanced SDP), retaining the existing AA/DLA mechanism for
assessing disability and the existing means-testing apparatus used for PC, etc.
Reforms  and  go a step further to provide protection for those who would
otherwise be excluded from qualifying for SDP by the ‘living alone’ rule. At
the other end of the spectrum, reform  would result in no disability
beneﬁts, means-tested or otherwise, for people aged  and over.
Data and simulation methods
Data
We use data from the UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) spanning the three
ﬁnancial years April  to March . The FRS is a continuous cross-
sectional survey, designed to be representative of UK private households,
with a sample size of around , households each year. It collects
detailed information on the personal characteristics and incomes of all
adults in the sampled households, enabling us to simulate the effects of
relevant changes to the beneﬁt system for a large sample of older people.
Importantly for this paper, the FRS distinguishes the care and mobility
components of DLA.Wework at the beneﬁt unit level and include all beneﬁt
units containing at least one person aged  and over but exclude those
containing an adult under state pension age ( for men,  for women at
the time of the surveys). There are , such units in the sample we use.
Table  summarises some relevant characteristics of the sample. Overall, a
little over  per cent of this sample report receiving AA or DLA. The FRS
asks respondents about difﬁculties in eight areas of daily life and we use
this to classify beneﬁt units by the number of such difﬁculties (disabilities).
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
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Fifty-ﬁve per cent of the sample have at least one such disability. AA/DLA
receipt reaches  per cent among those with three or more disabilities per
person in the beneﬁt unit. The large majority of beneﬁt units consist of a
couple (%) or a lone woman (%) with only a small minority consisting
of lonemen (%). The proportion of those lonemen who receive AA/DLA
is a little below the average for the whole sample. A comparison of the third
and fourth columns of Table  indicates that there are small but not
negligible proportions of the sample reporting receipt of the mobility but
not the care component of DLA.
The simulation method
The information in the FRS is used to simulate income tax liability,
entitlement to means-tested beneﬁts for the beneﬁts units in our selected
sample and reforms to AA and DLA together with any related reforms to
means-tested beneﬁts. We use a microsimulation model (CARESIM). This
model is a dynamic microsimulation model whose primary aim is to examine
the effect of alternative care charging policies, for a base year and for future
years, for people aged  and over sampled in the UK FRS (Hancock et al.
). For this paper we use the part of the model which simulates income
tax and means-tested beneﬁt entitlement of sample members. It does this
using the very detailed information on incomes and other characteristics
collected in the FRS that is needed to assess income tax liability and beneﬁt
entitlement. The model is used here as a static tax-beneﬁt model since
simulations are performed only for the base year. It has been enhanced to
simulate reforms to AA and DLA for people aged + who report receipt of
T A B L E . Sample characteristics
Percentage of
+ beneﬁt
units
Percentage of +
beneﬁt units receiving
AA or DLA care
Percentage of +
beneﬁt units receiving
AA/DLA care ormobility
No. of reported
difﬁculties per adult
beneﬁt unitmember:
None   
One or two   
Three or more   
Type of beneﬁt unit:
Couples   
Lone men   
Lone women   
All   
Notes : AA: Attendance Allowance. DLA: Disability Living Allowance.
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one of these beneﬁts in the FRS. The FRS excludes people living in care
homes so our analysis is restricted to people living in private households.
There is no source of information which provides the degree of detail on the
incomes and other relevant characteristics of the care home population that
is collected in the FRS and necessary for the analysis in this paper. However,
approximately two-thirds of care home residents receive some support from
a Local Authority with their care home fees. As a result they cease to receive
AA, DLA and the SDP, and hence would be unaffected by their withdrawal.
The exclusion of care home residents is therefore not as limiting as it might
seem.
We allow for non take-up ofmeans-tested beneﬁts drawing onDepartment
for Work and Pensions estimates of the pensioner caseload take-up rates for
each beneﬁt and evidence on the pattern of multiple beneﬁt take-up
(Hancock et al. ). Our approach is similar to that used by Sutherland
et al. (). Take-up of each beneﬁt is randomly assigned to an appropriate
proportion of those entitled. Where a pensioner unit is assigned to take up
their pre-reform beneﬁt entitlement, they are assumed also to take up any
post-reform entitlement. For PC, we assume that the take-up rate by those
entitled to the GC is higher than for those entitled only to the SC rate and
that take up of HB and CTB is  per cent for those taking up any
entitlement to PC. Take up of CTB by those not receiving PC is assumed to
be lower among owner-occupiers than among renters. This method allows
only indirectly for the known relationship between take up and size of
entitlement and assumes that take-up probabilities are not changed by a
policy reform. We do not allow directly for any change in take-up behaviour
which could be induced by the reforms we consider. In practice take-up of
entitlements may be lower under means-testing than under a system where
entitlement depends only on disability and this is not fully reﬂected in our
results. Allowance for this possibility would require statistical modelling of
take-up behaviour and simulation of changes in take up induced by the
reform, in the manner discussed by Pudney, Hancock and Sutherland
().
Note that the simulations refer only to the household-resident population,
so we are not capturing the effects of the reforms on the institutional
population, nor any effect they might have on the relative sizes of the
household and institutional populations.
Income is expressed in  prices. Income from those social security
beneﬁts not covered in the simulation process has been adjusted according
to movements in the relevant rates of beneﬁts between the survey year and
the ﬁnancial year. Other non-simulated types of pre-tax income have been
adjusted by movements in the all-items Retail Price Index before applying
the simulation model.
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Aggregate budgetary cost savings generated by the reforms are con-
structed by grossing-up the FRS data to the level of the household
population. No allowance is made for any under-reporting of AA/DLA
receipt in the FRS. Thus, simulated aggregate costs of the AA/DLA system
and the savings generated by reform are both likely to be understated to
some degree. For example, the savings generated by reform  correspond to
the annual cost of AA. Administrative statistics indicate that in  this cost
was some £. billion for the UK compared to our estimate of savings of £.
billion from abolishing AA while retaining the SDP at its current level.
Administrative ﬁgures include AA paid to people in care homes and to
people with partners below state pension age. Both these groups are
excluded from our sample. Even so, the comparison suggests that our results
probably underestimate public expenditure savings. However, we believe
they provide a good indication of the relative savings from the different
reforms.
The pattern of reform impacts by income
Table  presents the estimated total public expenditure savings from the
reforms, together with average weekly equivalised losses for couples, lone
men and lone women, and by number of reported disabilities per person
(one or two disabilities and three or more disabilities per person).
The ranking of public expenditure savings is as would be expected.
Abolishing AA, both components of DLA and the SDP saves about £.
billion a year. To put this in context, it exceeds the UK budget deﬁcit of £.
billion for our reference year –, but is small relative to the £.
billion deﬁcit for –. Options which increase the SDP save the least:
£. billion if only AA is withdrawn and the AA-contingent SDP increased;
£. billion if AA and DLAc are withdrawn and SDP increased. The absence
of large potential savings from this switch to means-testing is not surprising,
given the signiﬁcant degree of implicit income targeting that already exists in
AA/DLA, as a result of the income-related incidence of disability and the
negative relationship between the probability of disability beneﬁt take-up
and income (Pudney ; Pudney et al. ). The effect of removing the
SDP ‘living alone’ rule can be seen by comparing reform  with reform  and
reform  with reform . The average weekly loss from abolishing AA and
DLAc is reduced from £. to £. if SDP is retained at its current level,
and from £. to £. when SDP is increased. The savings in annual
expenditure are correspondingly lower.
The impact varies considerably across population groups. Losses are
particularly high for those with three or more disabilities per person, and are
Impact of reforms to disability beneﬁts for older people
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T A B L E . Mean weekly equivalised losses by pensioner unit type and total annual public expenditure savings, 
prices
Reform
Mean weekly losses (£)
Annual public
expenditure
savings (£ billion)
All +
beneﬁt
units Couples
Single
men
Single
women
One or two
disabilities
per adult
Three or more
disabilities per
adult
() No AA or AA-contingent SDP . . . . . . .
() No AA, SDP retained . . . . . . .
() No AA, AA-contingent SDP increased . . . . . . .
() No AA, DLAc or SDP . . . . . . .
() No AA or DLAc, SDP retained . . . . . . .
() No AA or DLAc, SDP increased . . . . . . .
() No AA, DLAc, DLAm, SDP . . . . . . .
() No AAor DLAc, SDP retained, living alone rule
removed
. . . . . . .
() No AA or DLAc, SDP increased, ‘living alone’
rule removed
. . . . . . .
Notes : AA: Attendance Allowance. DLAc: Disability Living Allowance care component. DLAm: Disability Living Allowance mobility component. SDP:
Severe Disability Premium.
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higher for single people (especially women) than for couples. Increasing the
SDP substantially reduces losses for all pensioner unit types but has the least
effect for couples – partly because they are less likely to fall within the scope
of means-tested beneﬁts and partly because it is harder for them to qualify
for the SDP. As would be expected, removing the SDP ‘living alone’ rule
reduces average losses for couples in particular but single pensioners also
beneﬁt.
In Figures –, we plot the average equivalised gain or loss generated by
these reforms against income for pensioner units, using the ﬁve alternative
income concepts for classiﬁcation purposes. We use smoothed income
proﬁles so as to reduce the raggedness in the plots that is a consequence of
random sampling from the population, without resorting to the use of
arbitrary income bands. Vertical lines on the graphs indicate the thre-
sholds of each of the ﬁve quintiles of the income distribution in question
enabling us to see at a glance how different deﬁnitions of income change the
extent to which losses from the reforms are concentrated in different parts of
the income distribution. This is the main purpose of the graphs.
Figures – show the incidence of losses in relation to income before
housing costs. They demonstrate the importance of the choice of
income deﬁnition used to classify people pre-reform. When total net
income (Figure : income deﬁnition I) is used, people in the bottom quintile
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Figure . (Colour online) Mean gains or losses (£ per week) from nine alternative reforms,
by income (income deﬁnition I: total pre-reform net income before housing costs; vertical
lines represent quintile points).
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are essentially unaffected and the largest losses are found among those with
total incomes (including the disability andmeans-tested beneﬁt which would
be affected by the reform) of around £ per week – which is well above the
median, in the fourth quintile of the pensioner income distribution. This
creates the impression that reform could be justiﬁable on grounds of
targeting efﬁciency. The average loss for this most heavily affected income
group is up to % of income, depending on the type of reform.
However, the pensioner income distribution is relatively compressed, so
that income differences between the quintiles are not large compared to the
potential losses produced by the reforms. Moreover, the people who would
experience these losses tend to rely on signiﬁcant amounts of beneﬁt
income, so that reform may have the effect of changing people’s position in
the distribution. Few of those affected by the reform are in the lowest quintile
of the total pre-reform income distribution because disability beneﬁts tend
to take recipients’ incomes above that level. Figure  shows that the largest
average loss is in fact experienced by people whose original incomes
(deﬁnition II: excluding means-tested and disability beneﬁts) are only
around £ per week – which is in the bottom quintile of original income.
Figure  is based on income deﬁnition III and shows that, in terms of
income before disability-related beneﬁt, the biggest average losses are to be
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Figure . (Colour online) Mean gains or losses (£ per week) from nine alternative reforms,
by income (income deﬁnition II: pre-reform original income before housing costs; vertical
lines represent quintile points).
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found among people with incomes around £ per week – which is in the
bottom quintile – but, for the more radical reforms ,  and , there are also
large impacts over a wider range up to £ or more. This suggests that
uncompensated removal of AA/DLA would have the effect of leaving
signiﬁcant numbers of people on very low incomes.
Figures  and  show the pattern of losses in relation to income after
housing costs, with disability beneﬁt either included in income (deﬁnition
IV) or excluded (deﬁnition V). Again, the choice of income deﬁnition
determines whether the biggest losers from reform appear to come from the
ﬁrst or fourth quintile of the pensioner income distribution.
Which of these income concepts should be used for presentational
purposes? The answer depends in part on the assumption wemake about the
costs of disability. If we believe that these costs are negligible, then there is a
case for using total net income (deﬁnitions I or IV), whereas, if we believe
that there are substantial additional living costs associated with disability and
that these costs are approximated by the level of AA/DLA/SDP, then the
income deﬁnitions that exclude disability beneﬁt (III and V) are more
appropriate. We consider this issue in more detail in the next section.
For all income concepts, reforms  and  (which protect low-income
beneﬁt units from the effect of AA/DLAwithdrawal by increasing SDP) have
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Figure . (Colour online) Mean gains or losses (£ per week) from nine alternative reforms,
by income (income deﬁnition III: pre-reform income excluding disability beneﬁts, before
housing costs; vertical lines represent quintile points).
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the lowest impact on the incomes of poor pensioners – although that impact
is still signiﬁcant at £– per week, equivalised. Moreover, this protection
extends only to people who take up their entitlement to means-tested
beneﬁts. Reforms ,  and , which abolish SDP alongside the withdrawal of
AA/DLA have a much greater distributional impact – of as much as £ per
week (equivalised), for people with other sources of income totalling only
around £ per week on average (Figure ). Reforms  and , which retain
the SDP at its current level, are intermediate between these cases.
Pre- and post-reform poverty rates and disability-related need
Figures  and  summarise the simulation results in terms of poverty rates.
They plot the proportion of beneﬁt units classed as poor against alternative
choices for the poverty line. These alternative poverty lines are constructed
as the relevant GC amount plus various proportions of the SDP and AA/DLA
amounts, and thus give amenu of disability-speciﬁc poverty deﬁnitions based
loosely on the assumptions implicit in the current design of the beneﬁt
system.
Poverty rates are between  and  per cent for all pensioner beneﬁt units
under the pre-reform system. It is only people who do not take up their
entitlements to means-tested beneﬁts and those with incomes below the
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Figure . (Colour online) Mean gains or losses (£ per week) from nine alternative reforms,
by income (income deﬁnition IV: total pre-reform net income after housing costs; vertical
lines represent quintile points).
 Ruth Hancock and Stephen Pudney
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Apr 2013 IP address: 86.170.93.246
poverty line but enough capital to disqualify them from means-tested
beneﬁts that are poor. Reforms which abolish AA/DLA but retain or
increase the SDP have little adverse effect on poverty rates for poverty
thresholds up to the GC + per cent of the current SDP. For higher
poverty thresholds and reforms which abolish the SDP, the effects are much
more marked. Under reform  which abolishes AA, both components of
DLA and the SDP, poverty rates reach  per cent of all pensioner units and
over  per cent for those with three or more disabilities at the highest
poverty threshold. Reform  which abolishes AA, the care component of
DLA and the SDP results in poverty rates for those with three or more
disabilities of up to  per cent. The most generous compensation through
the SDP (reform ) would reduce this to  per cent.
The allowances we make for the additional costs of disability in deﬁning
the poverty threshold are clearly crucial. In this paper these allowances are
set at varying proportions of the amounts of AA/DLA and SDP. The current
disability and means-tested beneﬁts system guarantees that pensioner units
who qualify for the higher/middle rates of AA/DLAc (which is necessary but
not sufﬁcient to qualify for the SDP) and for the SDP, and who claim any
entitlement to means-tested beneﬁts will have incomes equal to at least the
GC plus the SDP plus their AA/DLA. It is hard to argue that this minimum
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Figure . (Colour online) Mean gains or losses (£ per week) from nine alternative reforms,
by income (income deﬁnition V: pre-reform original income after housing costs; vertical lines
represent quintile points).
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income takes recipients of it out of poverty as this would suggest that the
combination of the SDP and AA/DLAc overestimates the costs of disability
faced by people who qualify for these additions. Hence the allowances that
we use in this paper for the extra costs of disability seem more likely to
understate than overstate the true costs.
Conclusions
We do not offer any opinion on whether there is a strong case for reform of
the UK disability beneﬁt system for older people, nor on which reform would
be the best option among the nine considered here. That requires a
judgement on the scale of support that society should offer to disabled older
people and on one’s views about income inequality within this part of the
population. Different commentators may arrive at different, equally de-
fensible, views on these issues. In addition, it is not uncommon for policy
reforms which create losers among existing beneﬁt recipients to provide
transitional protection to those recipients in which case the effects are felt by
future potential claimants rather than existing ones. However, unless the
population of future claimants differs substantially in relevant ways from
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Figure . (Colour online) Pre- and post-reform poverty rates by poverty line: pensioner
beneﬁt units with disabilities. (a) Beneﬁt units with one or two disabilities per person;
(b) beneﬁt units with three or more disabilities per person. Notes: AA: Attendance Allowance.
DLAc: Disability Living Allowance care component. DLAm: Disability Living Allowance
mobility component. GC: Guarantee Credit. LAR: ‘living alone’ rule. SDP: Severe Disability
Premium.
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current claimants, analyses of the effects that reforms would have if
implemented for existing claimants remain relevant.
However, we do have some deﬁnite and striking conclusions about the
factors to be considered whenmaking judgements about policy reform. First,
the method we choose to describe the predicted outcomes of projected
reforms may make an enormous difference to the way those outcomes
appear to the policy maker. So presentation matters. When presented in the
way that was used in the  State of the Nation report, abolition of AA/DLA
appears not to have a major adverse effect on the poor. But this is misleading
because AA/DLA is included in the measure of income used to classify
people as poor or non-poor. Using our preferred income deﬁnition for
classiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that abolition of AA/DLA would in fact have a large
impact on the poorer part of the older population.
A second important conclusion is that we must be careful in deﬁning low-
income status for people with disabilities. If disability brings with it additional
needs which can only be met with additional expenditure, then the same
poverty line should not be used for disabled and non-disabled people. To
investigate this, we have used various disability-speciﬁc poverty lines related
to the assumptions about the costs of disability which are implicit in the
design of the current beneﬁt system. We ﬁnd that this has a large inﬂuence
on the results of the policy simulations, with the more radical cuts in
AA/DLA/SDP having a major impact on the incomes of large groups of
poorer disabled pensioners. Even reforms that seek to protect low-income
people by retaining the SDP at its current level whilst abolishing AA/DLA
have a large impact on poverty rates if the poverty line is chosen to be
consistent with the costs of disability implicit in the current design of the
beneﬁt system.
Our analysis has focused on a potential policy reform which is the subject
of debate in the UK and in detail is speciﬁc to the UK system of disability
beneﬁts. However, our main conclusions on the importance of the methods
used to assess the impact of potential policy reforms are relevant to all
reforms to cash or in-kind beneﬁts which are intended to meet extra costs.
More generally, care is needed in choosing an appropriate income construct
when judging a household’s ability to cope with a potentially large reduction
in its income by reference to its position in the pre-reform income
distribution.
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NOTES
 Although in most means-tested beneﬁts this extra amount is called the Severe
Disability Premium, ofﬁcially in Pension Credit it is called the Severe Disability
Addition but has the same rules. We use the term SDP throughout as it is better
known.
 The ofﬁcial Households Below Average Income analysis treats council tax as a
deduction frombefore-housing costs income (like income tax) rather than as a
housing cost. Instead, we see it as a tax on housing consumption analogous to
excise taxes. We assume that housing costs fall entirely to the beneﬁt unit
which contains the head of household and that the small proportion of other
beneﬁt units in our analysis do not incur housing costs.
 The modiﬁed OECD scale for income before housing costs is the sum of  for
the ﬁrst adult, . for each subsequent adult or child aged  years or older,
and . for each younger child. There is a different scale for income after
housing costs:  for the ﬁrst adult, . for each subsequent adult of child aged
 years or over, . for each younger child.
 There is a direct parallel here with the construction of index numbers, where
we have a choice between the use of the ex-ante situation as a benchmark (the
Laspeyres index) or the ex-post situation (the Paasche index).
 The highest amount of £. occurs where both partners in a couple
receive AA or the middle or highest care rate of DLA and qualify for two
SDPs.
 For a couple to be eligible for at least one SDP, both partners must receive AA
or DLAc at the middle or higher rate, or the one not meeting this condition
must be registered blind, and at least one of them must not have anyone
receiving Carers Allowance for them.
 Subject tomaximumeligible costs and any deductions whichmay apply if there
are people other than the beneﬁt unit living in the home.
 Under reforms which remove AA/DLA but retain or enhance the SDP those
excluded from beneﬁt are likely to be a similar group to those who are
currently excluded from state help with their domiciliary care costs because of
the similarity in themeans tests for social security beneﬁts and for help with the
costs of domiciliary care.
 We remove all conditions which can prevent recipients of AA or the middle/
higher rate of DLAc from qualifying for the SDP.
 The eight areas of life are: mobility (moving about); lifting, carrying or
moving objects; manual dexterity using hands for daily tasks; continence
(bladder/bowel control); communicating (speech, hearing or eyesight);
memory/concentration/learning/understanding; recognising when in phys-
ical danger; physical co-ordination.
 The assumed take-up rates are: entitled to GC (with or without SC): . per
cent; entitled to SC only:  per cent; entitled to HB/CTB and receiving PC:
 per cent; entitled toHB and not receiving PC:  per cent; entitled to CTB
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and not receiving PC: . per cent (renters) and . per cent (owner-
occupiers).
 This is derived using the Department for Work and Pensions tabulator
tool (http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=tabtool) and statistics
from the Department of Social Development in Northern Ireland (http://
www.dsdni.gov.uk/dla).
 Source: HM Treasury Public Finances Databank,  July .
 Smoothing is done using local linear least-squares regression (Cleveland
), using a tricube weighting function and a bandwidth of ..
 However, the asymmetric treatment of pre- and post-reform income remains a
problem.
 Since we are using poverty thresholds linked to the parameters of the beneﬁt
system, these poverty rates are considerably lower than those which use
thresholds such as  per cent of median household income. For example, the
ofﬁcial UK Households Below Average Income series for – estimates
that  per cent of pensioner households were living in poverty (Department
for Work and Pensions ).
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